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We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game, focusing on the effects that are
brought about by the delayed distribution of goods that accumulate in groups due to the continuous investments
of cooperators. We find that intermediate delays enhance network reciprocity because of a decelerated invasion
of defectors, who are unable to reap the same high short-term benefits as they do in the absence of delayed
distribution. Long delays, however, introduce a risk because the large accumulated wealth might fall into the
wrong hands. Indeed, as soon as the curvature of a cooperative cluster turns negative, the engulfed defectors
can collect the heritage of many generations of cooperators and by doing so start a waning-moon pattern that
nullifies the benefits of decelerated invasion. Accidental meeting points of growing cooperative clusters may also
act as triggers for the waning-moon effect, thus linking the success of cooperators with their propensity to fail
in a rather bizarre way. Our results highlight that “investing in the future” is a good idea only if that future is
sufficiently near and not likely to be burdened by inflation.
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Large segments of our economy rely on continuous invest-
ments into a common pool that, at least so we are told, will or
are very likely to pay off sometime in the future. Retirement
plans and investments into the public health care and education
system fall under this category, while somewhat shorter-term
examples might include investing some fraction of personal
wealth into a startup business or becoming a shareholder of a
company with bright prospects. Either way, more often than
not, the payoff from an investment is likely not going to be
immediate, but rather it will set in with a delay.
The public goods game [1] captures the essential social
dilemma that is linked with investments into a common
pool. Those that contribute are cooperators, while those that
do not are defectors. All the contributions within a group
are multiplied to take into account synergetic effects of
cooperation and the resulting amount is divided equally among
all group members irrespective of their strategies. If nobody
invests, the group fails to harvest the benefits of a collective
investment and the society may evolve towards the “tragedy of
the commons” [2]. Recently identified ways of avoiding this
include the introduction of volunteering [3], social diversity
[4], bipartiteness [5,6], random exploration of strategies [7],
repeated group interactions [8], the risk of collective failures
[9], selection pressure [10], conditional strategies [11], rare
malicious agents [12], and multiplexity [13–16].
The game in its traditional form, however, does not take into
account delays that might occur before the investments can
actually be capitalized upon. Taking such delays into account
essentially means altering the time scales of evolutionary
dynamics [17–19]. Previous research showed that the diversity
in reproduction time scales [20] and the coevolution of time
scales [21] both promote cooperation. Indirect ways of altering
the time scales, for example, by means of breaking the
symmetry between interaction and replacement [22], wealth
accumulation [23], consideration of long-term benefits [24], or
other coevolutionary processes [25–27], have also been noted
as beneficial for resolving social dilemmas. The application
of a delayed distribution of accumulating goods, however,
cannot be considered as a simple separation of time scales
between learning (strategy adoption) and interaction (payoff
accumulation) processes because cooperators, as we will
see, lose their payoff permanently between two consecutive
distributions, while the effective payoff of defectors remains
unchanged.
Here we therefore study the evolution of cooperation in the
public goods game on the square lattice [28], whereon initially
each player on site x is designated either as a cooperator (si =
C) or defector (si = D) with equal probability. Regardless of
their strategies, players receive a return on their investments
from five overlapping groups of size G = 5 [29], but they do
so only after each τ th round of the game. The payoff to each
player stemming from a particular group is then r
∑
i,k ci,k/G,
where the sum runs over all the players within a group (i =
1, . . . ,G) and over τ rounds of the game (k = 1, . . . ,τ ) and ci,k
is the contribution of player i to the common pool during the
kth round. Without loss of generality, cooperators contribute
1 during each round of the game while defectors contribute
nothing.
Unlike the distribution of public goods, the strategy
transfers between randomly selected neighbors are possible
during each round of the game and proceed according to the
probability w = {1 + exp[(Pi − Pj )/K]}−1, where K = 0.5
determines the uncertainty by strategy adoptions [29]. To take
properly into account the seasonality that is introduced due to
the delayed distribution of accumulating goods, the payoffs
Pi entering the Fermi function w are averaged over the last
τ rounds of the game. Note that this is necessary because the
impact of each newly acquired payoff should last until the next
distribution. During each full Monte Carlo step all players will
have a chance to pass their strategy once on average. We have
used the square lattice having L = 200–4800 linear size and
up to 106 Monte Carlo steps (MCS) before determining the
fraction of cooperators fC within the whole population. Since
the model is very simple, introducing only a single additional
parameter τ to the game, the results should not be seen as
describing a particular situation, but rather outline general
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Fraction of cooperators fC dependent on
the multiplication factor r for different values of the distribution
delay τ , as indicated in the legend. The positive trend for small and
intermediate delays reverses when long delays are applied.
consequences that may set in due to delayed distributions in
the realm of collective social dilemmas.
Figure 1 shows how delays in distribution affect the
evolution of public cooperation. It can be observed that short
and intermediate delays significantly lower the minimally
required multiplication factor r that is needed for cooperators
to survive and dominate in the population. By comparing
the results for τ = 11 and 20, however, we find that the
trend reverses, affecting particularly strongly the threshold for
cooperator dominance. For τ = 50 cooperators are no longer
able to eliminate defectors within the r  G limit, while the
threshold value of r for the survival of cooperators increases
back to the rc value recorded at τ = 1.
The nonmonotonic impact of delays in the distribution of
public goods is depicted in Fig. 2, where the bell-shaped outlay
of the fC versus τ dependence indicates two competing effects
affecting the evolution of cooperation. On the upside, delays
help cooperators because they prevent defectors from utilizing
a temporarily high payoff via a fast invasion. Although
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Fraction of cooperators fC dependent on
the distribution delay τ for r = 3.6. An optimal value of τ provides
the best conditions for the evolution of cooperation. The inset shows
results obtained for K = 0.1, 0.5, and 0.8, from left to right.
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Waning-moon effect, emerging sponta-
neously on a growing cooperative cluster [depicted in blue (black)],
as observed at τ = 50 and r = 3.65. (a) and (b) The cluster grows
until its border has positive curvature. (c) As soon as the curvature
becomes negative, which happens by chance due to the fluctuations
along the expanding interface, defectors [depicted in red (gray)]
can invade the bulk of the cluster. The cluster keeps growing on
the other end, but the invasion of defectors is faster, resulting in
the waning-moon pattern. The total area occupied by cooperators
decreases until somewhere again a small cooperative cluster with
positive curvature around the entire border emerges (not shown).
From that point onward the whole cycle starts anew. Snapshots of the
200 × 200 square lattice were taken (b) 200, (c) 250, (d) 300, (e) 350,
and (f) 600 MCS after panel (a).
cooperators are also negatively affected by the delays because
they are unable to capitalize immediately on their investments,
defectors are ultimately the ones who suffer more from the de-
celerated invasion capabilities. We emphasize that the invasion
of cooperators is always slower because it needs a collective
effort and hence the slowdown of the speed of invasions
effectively enhances network reciprocity. Qualitatively similar
observations were made in Ref. [30], where a less aggressive
punishment strategy outperformed rewarding; in Ref. [31],
where the reduced speed of invasion due to aging affected
defectors more adversely than cooperators; and in Ref. [13],
where the suppressed feedback of individual success due to
biased utility functions leads to a spontaneous separation
of characteristic time scales of the evolutionary process on
interdependent networks. From a different point of view, the
described mechanism can also be interpreted as a memory
effect (referring to the memory of preceding payoffs, not
strategies) because a defector cannot utilize its potentially
high current payoff due to preceding smaller payoffs, hence
precluding a fast invasion. In general, cooperation is promoted
because the aggressive invasion of defectors is more sensitive
to the slowing down than the buildup of collective efforts in
sizable groups.
While the upside of delays for the evolution of public
cooperation is rooted in decelerated invasion, the downside
manifests in a more subtle manner. Spatial patterns presented
in Fig. 3 provide vital insights. Even for low values of r ,
cooperative clusters are able to grow in the sea of defectors
due to enhanced network reciprocity [Figs. 3(a) and 3(b)], as
described above. Due to uncertainties in the strategy adoption,
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however, the front separating cooperators and defectors is
not completely sharp and it may happen that somewhere
the curvature becomes negative. As Figs. 3(c)–3(f) illustrate,
this becomes the entry point for defectors to invade. A
characteristic waning-moon pattern emerges and accordingly
we dub this the waning-moon effect, which is intimately
related to the delayed distribution of accumulating public
goods. Namely, as soon as the curvature becomes negative,
a lucky defector becomes surrounded by cooperators and as
such is scheduled to receive a huge payoff that is due to the
preceding collaborative efforts. In fact, it is about to receive the
heritage of many generations of cooperators and this will have
a positive impact on its payoff also in the following τ rounds of
the game despite the fact that the neighborhood will gradually
turn defective. Ironically, the high payoff should have gone
to a cooperator that contributed previously, but had turned
defector before the distribution round. The lucky defector
will also have an evolutionary advantage over neighboring
cooperators because the latter will continue to contribute to the
common pool. Although due to enhanced network reciprocity
cooperators may continue to spread at the other side of the
moon, their propagation speed will be lower than the invasion
of defectors, ultimately resulting in the waning-moon pattern.
The only chance for cooperators not to disappear entirely is if
a small fraction of the previous homogeneous domain remains
bounded by a front with positive curvature, at which point
the whole process starts again. It is worth mentioning that the
emergence of the waning-moon pattern is a nice example of
when the movement of a front separating two homogeneous
phases depends sensitively on the sign of the curvature.
Besides the spontaneous emergence of negative curvature
due to fluctuations in the cooperative front, the latter also
appears whenever two growing domains meet, as illustrated in
Fig. 4. Due to the same reasons as described above, this will
open the gate for the invasion of defectors [Figs. 4(d) and 4(e)]
and again the only hope for cooperators is the emergence of
smaller homogenous clusters with overall positive curvature
[Fig. 4(f)]. Since the successful growth of cooperative clusters
is thus inseparably linked with their failure in an intricate
and quite bizarre turn of events involving large-scale spatial
patterns, it is important to use sufficiently large system size
L. This lowers the amplitude of fluctuations of fC , first
because then the growth and decline of the cooperative cluster
are unlikely to be synchronized in time, but also because
more frequent collisions prevent the emergence of extreme,
nearly homogeneous states. Regardless of what triggers the
waning-moon effect, it is straightforward to see that both
the probability and the severity of such an event increase
as we increase τ . Accordingly, larger τ gradually nullify the
positive effects stemming from enhanced network reciprocity
by evoking the waning-moon effect more frequently and in
a more potent form, in turn giving rise to the bell-shaped
dependence depicted in Fig. 2. Evidently, these phenomena
are rooted in pattern formation on structured populations and
as such cannot emerge in well-mixed systems.
Since long-term investments are frequently subject to
inflation, it remains of interest to determine their impact on
the described evolutionary dynamics. To do so, we assume
that some fraction of accumulating public goods gets lost
between two consecutive distribution events. Thus, the longer
(d) (e) (f)
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FIG. 4. (Color online) (a)–(c) Growing cooperative clusters may
collide, naturally giving rise to (d) interfaces with negative cur-
vature and thus triggering the waning-moon effect. (e) Defectors
are therefore able to invade until (f) small cooperative clusters
reemerge and start growing again. The borders of these clusters
will collide anew and so the process is repeated. Note that initially
the cooperative cluster actually collides with itself due to periodic
boundary conditions. We have intentionally applied a small system
size for clarity, although of course the same collapse of independently
growing domains can be observed for larger L as well. The parameters
are the same as in Fig. 3, and snapshots were taken (b) 550, (c) 1250,
(d) 1800, (e) 2020, and (f) 2630 MCS after panel (a).
the delay, the larger the fraction that is lost. Technically this
can be accommodated by multiplying the accumulated public
goods with a factor qτ before each distribution, where q < 1
characterizes the rate of inflation. Although this seems to
work against the success of long-term investments, we note
that it may also weaken the waning-moon effect because
defectors will inevitably inherit a smaller amount than in
the absence of inflation. Evidently, the value of q should not
be too small (inflation too large), as this may erase all earnings
and preclude the observation of interesting collective behavior.
For example, losing 1% (q = 0.99) at every round sounds
bearable, yet each group will have lost 40% of the accumulated
goods upon reaching τ = 50. We thus use q = 0.99, but note
that similar behavior can be observed also when using larger
inflation rates within reasonable bounds. As depicted in Fig. 5,
the bell-shaped dependence of fC on τ survives and with it
thus also enhanced network reciprocity and the waning-moon
effect. In particular, it is still beneficial to accumulate public
goods for a while before distribution (fC = 0 if τ  3),
although the inflation will lower the maximally attainable
level of public cooperation under the same conditions as
well as narrow the window where the enhanced network
reciprocity due to decelerated invasion can offset the looming
waning-moon effect (compare with Fig. 2).
In sum, we have studied the evolution of cooperation in
the spatial public goods games on the square lattice, focusing
in particular on revealing the impact of delayed distribution
of continuously accumulating goods. Motivated by actual
experience, indicating that the payoffs from investments often
come with a delay, we find that intermediate delays actually
can promote the evolution of public cooperation. The positive
effect is due to a decelerated invasion, which strengthens
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Fraction of cooperators fC dependent on
the distribution delay τ for r = 3.6 and inflation q = 0.99 (see the
main text for details). Cooperators do not survive if τ  3 and
fare optimally at τ = 8. Note also that due to inflation the overall
maximum is lower and the bell narrower than in Fig. 2 (without
inflation).
network reciprocity. Interestingly, delays in distribution ad-
versely affect the invasion speed of both strategies. Coop-
erators are unable to benefit from the collective investment
immediately despite continuously paying the price for it, yet
the defectors are also unable to exploit them continuously
because of that. Defectors are ultimately those who suffer more
from their decelerated invasion capabilities, as they are unable
to gain the high short-term benefits that would allow them to
invade in the absence of delays. As the delays grow, however,
not just the accumulated wealth becomes larger, but also the
probability that it will fall into the hands of defectors. We have
dubbed the phenomenon the waning-moon effect because of
the characteristic shape of the vanishing cooperative clusters
it introduces. The effect is triggered by negative curvatures of
the interfaces separating cooperators and defectors, which may
occur because of either random fluctuations along the invasion
front or collision of two or more growing cooperative clusters.
Defectors effectively become surrounded by cooperators that
may have until then accumulated a large wealth. When
distribution time comes, defectors are simply handed down
the heritage from generations of cooperators, which nullifies
the positive effects of enhanced network reciprocity. The
larger the delays, the more likely and the more devastating
the waning-moon effect is going to be, until essentially all
the benefits from delayed distribution vanish. We have also
shown that inflation acting on the accumulating contributions
narrows the interval of optimal delays and in fact strongly
jeopardizes the potential success of long-term investments. We
conclude that the latter are likely to yield the desired income
if investing in the future refers to the near future.
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